I totally commiserate with Sean McVay and his desire to jettison Jared Goff to bring in a potential franchise quarterback. McVay couldn’t get enough out of Goff, and every year, it progressively declined.
We know how valuable early leads can be and how good McVay has been at dialing up early offense.
Examine early down passing efficiency in the game’s first half since 2018, when the Rams went to the Super Bowl:
2018: 0.22 EPA/att (third), 8.6 YPA (8.8 aDOT)
2019: 0.19 EPA/att (fourth), 7.6 YPA (7.1 aDOT)
2020: -0.10 EPA/att (29th), 6.9 YPA (5.5 aDOT)
This translated onto the scoreboard, as most passing metrics do. Average halftime lead by season:
2018: up by 5.2 points
2019: up by 1.1 points
2020: down by 0.4 points
The Rams also scored less in the second half last year than in either of the two prior years.
So then, how did they win 10 games last year? The defense was phenomenal, they played very weak offenses, and they held these opposing teams to an average of only 6.7 second half points.
In the last seven years, only two other defenses out of 224 total held opponents to 6.7 second half points or lower, it’s that rare and that great.
One specific phase of the passing game that regressed was Goff’s performance with play-action. He was bad without play-action for a few seasons, but using play-action stopped having the +EV that it once delivered. By design, McVay’s offense has one of the highest play-action rates in the NFL, so when it’s not producing benefits, that takes away a huge edge the team is accustomed to getting. Examine Goff’s performance with play-action the last three years:
2018: 0.32 EPA/att, 9.6 YPA (11.0 aDOT)
2019: 0.13 EPA/att, 7.9 YPA (7.9 aDOT)
2020: 0.05 EPA/att, 7.8 YPA (6.1 aDOT)
Keep in mind, the NFL average is 0.11 EPA/att and 8.3 YPA. Goff regressed tremendously.
Last year, 55% of Goff’s passing yardage came after the catch and only 45% came from air yards. That ranked 40th in the NFL. This was substantially worse than 2019 (52% was from air yards) even though Goff still ranked one of the worst (26th) in air yards as a percentage of total yards.
Another phase that regressed was Goff’s ability to throw outside the numbers with accuracy. Look at the splits by year on passes outside the numbers that traveled 14 or more yards past the line of scrimmage:
2018: 0.29 EPA/att, 11.5 YPA, 43% success, 59% on-target rate
2019: 0.18 EPA/att, 9.9 YPA, 41% success, 52% on-target rate
2020: -0.15 EPA/att, 8.4 YPA, 33% success, 43% on-target rate
His average aDOT was consistent across the three years when we isolate for just these mid-range to deeper throws.
Additionally, all Level 3 throws fell off as well, those that Sports Info Solutions deep have launched trajectory and are high-arc passes usually reserved for deep balls.
Compare Goff to the NFL average in just 2020:
Goff: -0.25 EPA/att, 6.6 YPA, 26% on-target rate
Avg: 0.24 EPA/att, 12.3 YPA, 46% on-target rate
Goff’s aDOT was consistent with the NFL average, he just was considerably worse when attempting these passes.
We already discussed how this translated to a worse halftime scoreboard margin. But it also translated into fewer points scored than projected.
Way fewer.
When the linemakers set lines on a game, they set a spread and a total — which team should win, by how many points, and how many total points will be scored. They then do the math to calculate team totals, the total points each team is projected to score. Linemakers generally do some “work” on these to get them just above or below key point totals and adjust the juice accordingly. If we forget the “work” and just look at the gameday spread and total, we can calculate unadulterated team totals.
Last year, on average, teams exceeded their projected point total in 8.3 games, as scoring was up. Only three teams exceeded their projected point total in no more than five of 16 games: the Eagles, the Texans, and the Rams.
The Rams offense underwhelmed last year, scoring less than their projected point total in 11 of 16 games, tied for worst in the NFL.
Over the last two years, the Rams scored fewer than their projected point totals in 19 of their 32 regular season games, fourth worst in the NFL.
McVay clearly believed there wasn’t much more he could do with Goff at quarterback. He couldn’t build off the run game with play-action nor could he threaten defenses deep. These are two fundamental things for the Rams (and really any) offense. That, coupled with inefficient early down passing, caused problems for the Rams and McVay wanted something with much more upside.
Enter Matthew Stafford, a tough, deep passing quarterback who never truly had a strong support system in Detroit. He’ll get that, and more, in Los Angeles.
Stafford has been a pro for 12 years, and the Lions were led by a defensive minded head coach for eight of them. While QB Winz are not stats to judge performance, one of the biggest swipes at Stafford is “he’s not a winner” and “look at the Lions’ records with Stafford.” So, it is interesting to note Stafford led the Lions to a 36-28 record (56%) with his offensive minded head coach in that four-year span. With the defensive minded head coaches, the Lions went 38-62-1 (38%).
I went on at length about how Jim Caldwell shouldn’t have been fired and how the Lions, with him at the helm, were their best version in decades. So I won’t go on about that here. But the bottom line is, with a talented offense and an offensive playcaller, Stafford led these Lions to their best run in years. In Los Angeles, he’s got an even better offensive playcaller running the show.
In trying to forecast what the 2021 Rams offense will look like, I went back to see how McVay evolved his offenses from 2018 to 2019 to 2020. I can conclude that the best thing about the Rams’ 2021 offense is we really don’t know what to expect. That makes it tough on opposing defenses from the NFC West and potentially exciting for us, fans of the NFL.
I personally believe the Rams return to the 11 personnel heavy system from earlier in McVay’s tenure. But what did that look like and how did it evolve?
In 2018, McVay was in 11 personnel on 93% of early downs in the first three quarters. He took the NFL by storm and marched to the Super Bowl but lost to the Patriots. When Cooper Kupp went down with injury, McVay continued 11 personnel at a 90%+ clip.
In 2019, he dropped the 11 personnel rate down to 69%, using 12 personnel at a 25% clip. But this was not some comprehensive plan that developed in the offseason. Examine the different spurts of high usage of 3+ WR sets by week:
Weeks 1-4: 3+ WRs at 95%, 1-2 WRs at 5% (all WRs healthy)
Weeks 5-7: 3+ WRs at 56%, 1-2 WRs at 44% (all WRs healthy)
Weeks 8-10: 3+ WRs at 95%, 1-2 WRs at 5% (Brandin Cooks is out with injury)
Week 11: 3+ WRs at 14%, 1-2 WRs at 86% (Brandin Cooks and Robert Woods out with injury)
Week 12: 3+ WRs at 96%, 1-2 WRs at 4% (all WRs healthy)
Weeks 13-17: 3+ WRs at 63%, 1-2 WRs at 37% (all WRs healthy, TE Gerald Everett out with injury)
Since we have the hindsight benefit of tracking player availability, personnel deployment, AND efficiency delivered, we can safely question some of these decisions. In 2018, McVay thought he could continue to use high rates of 11 even without Kupp and win the Super Bowl. It almost worked. I could see what he was thinking. But had he studied efficiency delivered by grouping on a weekly basis, he would have seen he could have used more 12. He likely gets more out of his offense down the stretch and wins that Super Bowl if he does.
In 2019, I completely get the return to high rates of 3-WR sets with his receiving corps healthy to start the season. But I couldn’t tell you why, in Weeks 5-7 in two losses and a win, McVay lowered 11 personnel sharply. I couldn’t tell you why, when Cooks was injured in Weeks 8-10 (a win and a 5-point loss), McVay jacked up 3+ WR sets even though Cooks was out. Week 11 and 12 obviously make sense. But I couldn’t tell you why, when Everett was out with injury to close the season, McVay jacked up the rate of 12 and Johnny Mundt at a high rate.
In the games in 2019 where the personnel deployment made sense and meshed with availability and McVay’s desired 3+ WR sets, the Rams went 4-2. When the personnel deployment didn’t seem to mesh as well with availability, the Rams went 5-5.
But 2020, on the other hand, was more predictable and made more sense. We actually forecast in last year’s book that McVay would use more 12 personnel and fewer 3+ WR sets. This hinged around the loss of Brandin Cooks in free agency and the lack of a true replacement (the only real WR addition was Van Jefferson).
McVay gave Van Jefferson more run in the first two weeks of 2020, which came at Josh Reynolds’s expense. But after that, McVay reduced Jefferson’s role substantially, and Reynolds resumed his role as WR3. But McVay was significantly more consistent with personnel deployment. Instead of being all over the map on a week-to-week basis, there was far more consistency in McVay’s agenda in 2020:
Simplify, stay consistent, use significantly more 12 personnel with occasional 13.
On early downs in a game’s first three quarters (same samples we pulled from 2018 and 2019), McVay reduced his personnel groupings from five various groupings in 2018 and 2019 down to three. And none of the three used 4-WRs. In the playoffs, like the regular season, McVay was simple — either 11 personnel or 12 personnel. On those early downs he didn’t have a single snap from anything other than 11 or 12.
Remember how often McVay was rolling out 95% usage of 3+ WRs in 2018 and 2019?
He didn’t have a single game with 90% usage. After Week 2, when he realized Van Jefferson wasn’t ready for primetime, there were only three games where McVay exceeded 75% usage of 11 personnel. All three games were losses when the Rams were down big:
Week 3 vs the Bills where the Rams trailed by 25 points
Week 12 vs the 49ers where the Rams trailed by 14 points
Week 15 vs the Jets where the Rams trailed by 17 points
Those were the only games McVay even exceeded 75% usage of his 3-wide sets, and it was only because of those margins.
Other than those games, this was a McVay team that used the most 12 personnel of any team in the NFL, calling for it on 42% of early downs in the first three quarters. The Eagles used it 41% of the time, the Titans 39%, but no team used it more than McVay except in those three blowout games.
I appreciated two things about his usage of 12 personnel. First, he tested 11 personnel for a couple of weeks with Van Jefferson, and even though the team won those games, he wasn’t satisfied with Jefferson’s contributions and shifted decisively towards the 12 personnel packages. Second, he made the move based on personnel and performance, rather than sticking to what he had done with success in the past.
The only problem with the usage of 12 personnel was the frequency at which the Rams ran from it, and the success of those runs.
The league average run rate from 12 personnel is 51% over the course of the first three quarters. Only three teams used 12 personnel to run the ball at least 60% of plays: the Jets, the Colts, and the Rams.
All three probably regret it. Examine rushing efficiency delivered by 12 for these teams:
Rams: -0.10 EPA/att, 4.2 YPC, 49% success
Jets: -0.19 EPA/att, 3.3 YPC, 43% success
Colts: -0.02 EPA/att, 3.6 YPC, 54% success
The Rams actually got above average success from 12 personnel runs on first down, but used 12 to run the ball often on second and even some on third down. And those efficiencies were terrible. Especially when you consider what the Rams were getting out of 12 personnel when passing the ball:
Passes: 0.30 EPA/att, 7.2 YPA, 64% success
Rushes: -0.34 EPA/att, 2.2 YPC, 46% success
Overall, the Rams on the season received more efficiency when passing from 12 than passing from 11. Any which way you slice it, whether looking at early downs, all four downs, first half, first three quarters, full game, etc – the Rams were more efficient when passing from 12 personnel.
And the Rams were much more efficient when running from 11 personnel. Regardless of running back or situation, when the Rams tried to run the ball from 12 or even 13 personnel, it was a disaster. Particularly when they were so efficient from 11.
Examine the rushing splits by personnel for the full game:
11 personnel: 0.07 EPA/att, 5.2 YPC, 59% success (229 att)
12 personnel: -0.16 EPA/att, 3.9 YPC, 47% success (193 att)
13 personnel: -0.32 EPA/att, 1.4 YPC, 29% success (48 att)
The Rams rushed more times out of 12 and 13 personnel combined (241 attempts) than they did out of 11 personnel, but recorded significantly worse production.
As an aside, it is rare that I generally disagree with the DVOA metric from Football Outsiders, but in that metric, the Rams rushing offense ranked fourth in rushing DVOA in 2020, and seventh when not adjusting for quality of opponent. This was not a top-5 rushing offense in 2020. Most other advanced metrics don’t get you there. In fact, only one subset of one metric does:
Looking at RB runs, the Rams ranked 26th in EPA/att, 13th in success rate and 17th in YPC.
Looking at all runs, the Rams ranked 24th in EPA/att , 15th in success rate, and 17th in YPC.
Looking at only early down runs in the first three quarters, the Rams ranked 16th in EPA/att, seventh in success rate and 12th in YPC.
So while the Rams were seventh (same as unadjusted DVOA) in early down rushing success in the first three quarters of games, they still were nearly average in EPA and YPC in those same situations.
And when you zoom out further, this team absolutely appeared to be considered not much more than an average rushing attack in 2020. That said, it could have been top-10 had they shifted more 12 personnel runs to 11 personnel. And perhaps McVay will do that more in 2021.
That brings us to the question of what we can expect McVay to do from a personnel deployment in 2021 with a brand new quarterback, without tight end Gerald Everett and with the infusion of wide receiver DeSean Jackson via free agency and their first pick in the draft (second round), wide receiver Tutu Atwell.
While McVay wasn’t hesitant to put Johnny Mundt out on the field at times and go to 2-WR sets even with three solid WR options healthy, I don’t see that being the case in 2021. The Rams are spending a lot of time this spring and early summer trying to figure out who that second tight end could be. Fourth-round receiver-turned-tight end Jacob Harris has been exclusively working with the tight ends this offseason, but Harris had just nine total reps as an in-line TE in college. Expecting him to blossom and play regularly as a rookie while making the position transition so well as to push DeSean Jackson off the field is very optimistic. There was also mention of college receiver Ben Skowronek transitioning to a FB/TE role. And then there’s Brycen Hopkins, a fourth-round tight end from the 2020 draft class who played only two offensive snaps last season.
It’s smart to try to find someone, as it’s a long season and you never know if one of your top-3 WRs goes down with injury. But if Robert Woods, Cooper Kupp, and DeSean Jackson are healthy, I just don’t see McVay pulling one of them off for a project tight end. To do that, McVay really must have seen the light that 2-TE sets are the way to go.
While it made sense to go more 12 when Kupp was injured in 2018 (though McVay stuck with 11) or when Cooks left the team in 2020 (and McVay transitioned to 12), I predict 3+ WRs on the field at a 90% clip in 2021, which will be a massive change from what we saw in 2020, where the Rams used the most 12 personnel in the NFL after Week 2, save for three losses that were blowouts at points.
The one thing a shift back to 11 would help with is the over-running from 12 personnel which resulted in heavy boxes that still were run into at a high rate.
We’re talking a really high rate.
In 2020, the Rams ran the ball into 8+ man boxes on 251 runs, 40% of their total rushing attempts. The only other team that came close to that was the Tennessee Titans.
40% of total runs go into 8+ man boxes ranked first in the NFL, tied with the Titans.
251 total runs into 8+ man boxes ranked second in the NFL, behind only the Titans.
These runs produced -0.10 EPA/att with only 3.9 YPC and a 51% success rate.
The vast majority of those runs came in 12 personnel (with some in 13). Compare the rushing efficiency for the Rams last year when they faced 8+ man boxes in 11 personnel vs 8+ man boxes with multiple TEs on the field:
11 personnel: 0.15 EPA/att, 5.4 YPC, 71% success
12/13/22 personnel: -0.21 EPA/att, 3.4 YPC, 43% success
When the Rams had multiple TEs on the field and the defense dropped 8+ men in the box, the Rams still ran the ball 77% of the time.
I discussed earlier how the Rams’ rushing efficiency was terrible from 12, and a large component of that was so many runs into loaded boxes that they didn’t check out for better looks.
The Rams generated a ton of efficiency running from 11 but were terrible from 12. If they resort back to 11 more often as an offense in 2021, that will help the run game. They can still use some 12, but it would be wise to have a high pass rate from 12 and use 11 to run. Both Cam Akers and Darrell Henderson were substantially better running from 11 than they were from 12.
With the Rams being one of the healthiest teams in the NFL the last two years, and having a tremendous defense, there is optimism that the team will be much better with a quarterback like Stafford. The futures market has gone crazy with Rams love. They are favored in 13 games this year and dogs in only three (one is a pick’em). Last year at this time, they were favored in only nine games and dogs in seven.
I forecast them to face the 10th-most difficult schedule based on win totals, which features one of the largest jumps in difficulty passing offenses faced. Last year, the Rams played the tenth-easiest schedule of pass defenses, this year they play the sixth-toughest. If McVay could get a little more aggressive on fourth downs, if the offense shifts to more 11 personnel and reduces runs out of 12 personnel, if the Rams can get more potent in the passing game, get play-action to work again, and pass better outside the numbers, this team will once again be in the playoffs and will be a force to reckon with in 2021.
Stay tuned over the next eight weeks as we preview all 32 teams with daily articles and videos right here at the preview hub. For complete team chapters featuring dozens of visualizations and 462 pages, pick up a copy of Warren Sharp’s new ‘2021 Football Preview’ book.
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